Contrary to Predecessors, Suleiman Will Emerge Stronger at the End of his Term
Naharnet feature
President Michel Suleiman's recent positions and political choices have sparked debates between the various Lebanese political factions. The president, who may have been “consensually” elected in 2008 through the Doha Accord that was brought about by Hizbullah's actions on May 7, 2008, is now in a semi-overt confrontation with the party over its internal and strategic choices.
The president, who did not protect the March 14 camp when he was army commander at the time of Hizbullah's actions on May 7, 2008, its occupation of downtown Beirut in 2006, and siege of then Premier Fouad Saniora at the Grand Serail, is now closer to adopting the March 14 camp's solutions to the government deadlock and Hizbullah's arms and fighting in Syria.
The president had enjoyed common stances with Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi since the latter's election over two years ago. His current positions on the government, as well as the parliamentary electoral law, however have become contradictory to those of the patriarch.
The president views as unjustified the Shiite AMAL and Hizbullah's rejection of the formation of a neutral government as an alternative to the crisis created by the March 8 and 14 camp's disagreement over a new cabinet. He had informed Speaker Nabih Berri and Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's envoys, during their last visit to the Baabda Palace, of his stances that protect Hizbullah on the internal, regional, and international scenes. These stances alleviate the negative repercussions of the party's historic error in intervening militarily in Syria, which was a violation of the Lebanese state's official stand of distancing itself from the crisis. Lebanon could have now been suffering from isolation, due to Hizbullah's confrontation with Arab and western powers, had it not been for Suleiman's positions towards these powers. His positions defend the party even if it refuses to acknowledge it.
Suleiman was clear in informing Berri and Nasrallah's envoys that he is defending the March 14 camp at this current stage for the same reasons he used to defend AMAL and Hizbullah when the camp enjoyed greater authority. The president is therefore practicing his role of ensuring balance among the Lebanese factions to prevent any side from monopolizing power.
Despite his efforts, Suleiman is slightly disappointed with the March 14 forces, and even more so with al-Rahi, because some of its leaders, especially the Christian ones, are making compromises over government and presidential positions at a time when they should support his proposal on the formation of a neutral cabinet.
He is disappointed with Bkirki because it has retracted its support for a neutral government without consulting him. Suleiman viewed this change as a translation of al-Rahi's fears that the presidential elections may be postponed in light of AMAL and Hizbullah's threats that they may obstruct the polls should a neutral cabinet be formed. A neutral government devoid of the March 8 and 14 camps will dump both of these sides out of power should either of them thwart the elections. They will therefore have to reach a consensus on a new president if they want to take part in rule. An all-embracing government, where both sides share power, will allow either one of them to hinder the elections should they believe that their candidate does not have a chance of winning.
At a time when both political camps are struggling with their political choices, Suleiman has emerged with a complete plan to ensure the rise of the state and its institutions. It has become evident that the Baabda Declaration, which he made all participants of the national dialogue adopt, was not an “improvised measure.” The president followed up this step by presenting a national defense strategy that preserves the resistance, but places its political and military decision-making power in the hands of the state. He also demonstrated that he has a clear vision to achieve his goals even after the March 8 camp shied away from respecting the Baabda Declaration. The 3 billion dollar Saudi grant to the Lebanese army is a demonstration of this political vision and evidence of his commitment to his choices against the political maneuvers of others. His success in earning Arab and international protection of Lebanon's state and institutions against the internal and foreign compromises of others is also further proof of this vision.
It seems that Suleiman's recent unwavering positions during the last few months of his term stem from his keenness on strengthening state institutions. Other presidents, during the end of their term, would have focused their efforts on guaranteeing that it be renewed or extended.
History may one day write that Suleiman was an exception to Lebanese presidents who start off their term strong and end it weak. Michel Suleiman will end his term stronger than how he began it because he would prefer to be remembered as a political leader in Aamchit rather than a “constitutional compromiser” in Baabda.
Source: Naharnet
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